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INSURANCE LAW
PHYLLIS DOW*

I. INTRODUCTION

Decisions concerning insurance have multiplied in recent years in New
Mexico. Changes have occurred with regard to naming insurance companies as parties,' the stacking of insurance policies, 2 suing insurance
companies directly,3 and in many other ways. 4 In addition, a new insurance code became effective in New Mexico in January of this year.'
Alterations in the code include a provision for a private cause of action
for violations of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act,' something which
did not previously exist.7
This is the first time the annual review issue has included an article
on insurance law. Therefore, the author has chosen to include decisions
from a broader time span than that ordinarily utilized. Also, certain aspects
of the revised insurance code will be discussed where appropriate. 8

II. TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PARTY
Both plaintiffs and defendants alike have grappled with the problem
of when, and under what circumstances, an insurance company may be
named as a party to a lawsuit. The question presents itself in numerous
ways. For example, if an insurance company has been named as a party
plaintiff because of subrogation rights, the defendant's insurer may be
added as a party. Alternatively, the plaintiff may wish to sue the insurer
directly for some alleged cause of action, such as for a bad faith failure
to pay proceeds of the policy after a loss. Numerous cases have treated
these various permutations in recent years.
*J.D., Pepperdine University, 1978; Associate, Montgomery & Andrews, Albuquerque, New
Mexico.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 9-26.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 62-81.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 27-56.
4. For example, automobile liability insurance is now mandatory in New Mexico. See N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 66-5-201 to -239 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
5. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§59A-1-1 to 59A-53-17 (1984).
6. Id.§59A-16-30.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 36-56.
8. Id.
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A. Naming an Insurer Based Upon Subrogation
The New Mexico Supreme Court once again addressed the issue of
when an insurance company should be named as a party and in what
manner when subrogation rights are involved in Safeco Insurance Co. of
America v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.9 The muddle of New
Mexico decisions which the court had to untangle in that case began with
Sellman v. Haddock.'" Sellman held that an insurer which has paid any
policy proceeds to its insured and which has become a subrogee thereby
is deemed to be an indispensable party to an action by the insured against
the person causing the injury." Pursuant to this rule, however, a defendant's insurer remained a disinterested party because the liability of its
insured had yet to be determined. Sellman thus created a situation whereby
a plaintiff could be forced to name his own insurer as a party plaintiff
and yet be unable to reveal either the fact of the defendant's insurance
or the defendant's insurer to the jury.
The supreme court recognized the possible inequities of this scenario
in Maurer v. Thorpe 2 and attempted to reach a different result. Reviewing
the well-established premise that a jury may become prejudiced against
a defendant by being made aware that the defendant has insurance, the
court held that premise no longer applicable when a plaintiff is forced to
join his insurer. 3 Instead, the court noted that the plaintiff could suffer
prejudice because the jury might think that the defendant is uninsured or
that the plaintiff has already been compensated and should recover no
additional damages.' 4 The Maurer court ruled that: "[A] plaintiff, who
is compelled by law to join his insurer and is then denied the right to
name the defendant's insurance carrier as a party-defendant, is prejudiced
in presenting his case and that such practice is fundamentally unfair and
violates concepts of due process of law.""' It should be noted, however,
9. 101 N.M. 148, 679 P.2d 816 (1984).
10. 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957).
11. Id. at 403, 310 P.2d at 1053. The court based its decision upon the fact that the insurer had
become a real party in interest since it could release the defendant from any and all claims to the
extent of the amount paid by it. Id. at 394, 310 P.2d at 1047.
12. 95 N.M. 286, 621 P.2d 503 (1980).
13. Id. at 287, 621 P.2d at 504. The attempts to prevent any evidence of insurance from being
presented before the jury have continued for innumerable years and are based upon a perception
that juries would tend to award more damages to a plaintiff if they knew an insurance company is
to bear the loss. See, e.g., Fort v. Neal, 79 N.M. 479, 444 P.2d 990 (1968); Falkner v. Martin, 74
N.M. 159, 391 P.2d 660 (1964).
With the onset of mandatory insurance, the soundness of this position is in question. The court
in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 101 N.M. 148, 152, 679 P.2d
816, 820 (1984), noted that "[c]ompulsory insurance may contribute to the modem juror's view
that insured parties are not uncommon." The growing awareness of insurance may eventually force
a reversal of the long-standing prejudice against evidence concerning insurance.
14. 95 N.M. at 287-88, 621 P.2d at 504-05.
15. Id. at 288, 621 P.2d at 505.

Spring 1985]

INSURANCE LAW

that the court specifically stated that it was not creating a direct action
against the defendant's insurer. 6
The ruling in Maurer was further solidified in Campbell v. Benson.17
In that case, the defendant's insurance company tried to distinguish Maurer
on the basis that the plaintiff had chosen to execute a subrogation agreement, rather than a loan receipt. Because of that choice, the company
argued, the plaintiff had voluntarily injected the issue of insurance coverage into the litigation and should, not be permitted to name the defendant's carrier. The court reviewed the case law which had ruled that a loan
receipt varies from a right to subrogation in that the former does not
render the insurance company an indispensable party.18 The court noted
that the selection between the two is often dictated by the insurance policy
and held that the defendant's insurer should also be made a party to the
action. "
In Safeco Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 2° the supreme court re-examined its earlier rulings concerning
the inclusion of insurance companies as pro forma parties. In that case,
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. brought a subrogation action against
two defendants. The insured was included as an involuntary plaintiff to
the extent of her deductible. One of the defendants was insured and his
insurer was joined as a party. The other defendant, however, had no
insurance. 2
The court rejected its earlier attempts to lessen the possible prejudice
which might arise as a result of the necessity to name an insurance
company as a party and specifically overruled Sellman v. Haddock,22
Maurer v. Thorpe,23 and Campbell v. Benson.24 The court outlined the

new procedural course as follows:
In future, when subrogated insurers are required by Civ. P.R. 17 to
be joined as a party, and the case is to be tried to a jury, the fact of
16. Id. New Mexico has followed the general rule that, absent contractual or statutory authority,
an injured party is precluded from bringing an action against his tortfeasor's insurer. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Sparks, 99 N.M. 152, 655 P.2d 539 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d
160 (1982).
17. 97 N.M. 147, 637 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1981).
18. Id. at 149, 637 P.2d at 580. Many courts have held that a loan receipt does not give the
insurance company a right of subrogation. The insurance company, therefore, is not an indispensable
party. 8B J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4946 (1982).
19. 97 N.M. at 150, 637 P.2d at 581. After Campbell, the court of appeals held that even when
a worker's compensation carrier becomes a party plaintiff due to its right of reimbursement, the
defendant's liability insurer need not be named. Schulte v. Bober Well Servicing Co., 98 N.M. 547,
650 P.2d 831 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 478, 649 P.2d 1391 (1982).
20. 101 N.M. 148, 679 P.2d 816 (1984).
21. Id. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817.
22. 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957).
23. 95 N.M. 286, 621 P.2d 503 (1980).
24. 97 N.M. 147, 637 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1981).
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the insurer's joinder is not to be disclosed to the jury. Instead, the
insured party shall assert his claim for all damages recoverable from
the one who allegedly caused the harm, including any amount for
which his insurer would be entitled to subrogation against the defendant or counter-defendant. If it is the insured who has been joined
.. . the requirement shall be the same. If the injured party or parties
should recover damages, the insurer shall then be permitted to prove
its subrogation claim to the trial court and, from the proceeds of any
recovery, the court shall apportion the recovery between the insured
25
and his insurer according to their respective entitlements.
Thus, under Safeco, the fact of insurance once again becomes a taboo
subject before the jury insofar as the insurer is a necessary party because
of rights of subrogation. 26
B. Direct Actions Against Insurance Companies
Perhaps one of the most active areas in insurance litigation in New
Mexico in recent years involves the question of whether an insured or a
third party may sue an insurer directly. The theories upon which parties
base their claims against insurance companies vary. All are grounded,
however, upon the fundamental proposition that an insurance company
and its agents owe certain duties of good faith and fair dealing to the
insured.
A common type of lawsuit against insurance companies and their agents
arises from a failure to procure insurance. For example, in Sanchez v.
Martinez,27 the plaintiffs brought suit on the basis that the defendant
insurance agent either breached a contractual duty to obtain a policy of
fire insurance or negligently failed to obtain such a policy.2 In discussing
an agent's liability for failure to procure insurance, the court noted:
An insurance agent or broker who undertakes to procure insurance
for others and, through his fault or neglect, fails to do so, may be
held liable for any damage resulting therefrom. Under such facts,
liability may be predicated either upon the theory that defendant is
the agent of the insured and has breached a contract to procure a
policy of insurance, or that he owes a duty to his principal to exercise
reasonable skill, care, and diligence in securing the insurance re25. 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
26. It should be noted, however, that the court also discussed the issue of evidence of insurance
before the jury and noted that it is permissible in some instances. Because of this observation, the
court withdrew N.M. U.J.I. Civil 2.8 (Repi. Pamp. 1980). 101 N.M. at 152, 679 P.2d at 820.
27. 99 N.M. 66, 653 P.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1982).
28. As presented to the jury, the sole issue in the case was whether the defendant could be held
liable on the basis of negligence. The court of appeals first addressed the issue of whether the statute
of frauds should have been submitted to the jury as a defense. The court held that the statute of
frauds did not constitute a defense to a negligence action. Id. at 69, 653 P.2d at 900.
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quested and negligently failed to do so. The defendant may be sued
for breach of contract or negligent default in the performance of a
duty imposed by contract or both. 29
An insurance agent, therefore, can be held liable for failure to procure
insurance under either a theory of contract or of negligence. The action
under negligence may be founded upon a duty imposed by an implied
contract which can be established by a course of conduct.30
The appropriate measure of damages for failure to procure insurance
constituted the primary issue in Topmiller v. Cain."'In Topmiller, an agent
had failed to obtain builder's risk coverage. There was a fire during
construction, and the plaintiffs suffered a loss. The trial court awarded,
in addition to the damages which resulted from the fire, the amount the
plaintiffs were required to expend in order to obtain second interim financing. The parties agreed that the latter sum was a foreseeable result
of the agent's negligence.32 The defendant cited several earlier cases which
had indicated that the proper amount of damages for a negligent failure
to procure would be the sum which would have been due under the policy
of insurance if it had been obtained.33 After a discussion of these earlier
decisions, the court found that the issue had not been resolved in New
Mexico. It cited with approval the following language from an Oregon
case:

Normally, causation requirements will limit any recovery to that
which the plaintiff would have received through the insurer if coverage had been provided. However, if the plaintiff is able to prove
that additional consequential damages resulted from the agent's failure to obtain coverage, he will then be entitled to recover those
consequential damages as well.'
The court could discern no reason for creating a special exception to
normal liability concepts in the insurance context and, therefore, approved
an award of consequential damages. The court did note that to recover
consequential damages, the plaintiff must prove that the damages were
29. Id. at 69-70, 653 P.2d at 900-01.
30. Id. at 70, 653 P.2d at 901.
31. 99 N.M. 311, 657 P.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1983).
32. Id. at 313, 657 P.2d at 640.
33. See, e.g., Jernigan v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 74 N.M. 37, 390 P.2d 278 (1964);
Jemigan v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 69 N.M. 336, 367 P.2d 519 (1961); Brown v. Cooley,
56 N.M. 630, 247 P.2d 868 (1952). The Topmiller court distinguished these cases on the basis that
"in each of these cases the damages discussed were recoverable under the policy if the policy had
been issued." 99 N.M. at 314, 657 P.2d at 641. See also Sanchez v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 66, 653
P.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1982) (denied claim for food and travel expenses); Lanier v. Securities Acceptance
Corp., 74 N.M. 755, 398 P.2d 980 (1965) (attorneys' fees not a proper item of damages).
34. 99 N.M. at 314, 657 P.2d at 641 (quoting Joseph Forest Prods., Inc. v. Pratt, 278 Or. 477,
-,
564 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1977)).
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proximately caused by the defendant's negligence and that they were
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the application for insurance.35
A recent issue which has appeared concerning direct actions against
insurance companies and their agents is whether the New Mexico Unfair
Insurance Practices Act36 ("the Act") creates a private cause of action.
The purpose of the Act is to regulate trade practices in the business of
insurance.37 It defines several practices which are designated as a violation
of the Act, such as misrepresentations made in the issuance of the policy
and unfair settlement practices.38 Until January 1, 1985, the Act did not
specifically provide a private cause of action to either the insured or a
third-party beneficiary.39 Rather, the Act invested all power of enforcement
in the Superintendent of Insurance: he is in charge of investigation,'
holding administrative hearings and making the determination of a violation,4" and assessing administrative penalties.42 Should he so choose,
he can bring an action in the district court for either an injunction43 or
civil penalties.4 4
Until very recently, the court of appeals had addressed the issue of
whether the Act creates a private cause of action only briefly. For example,
in Gonzales v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,4" the issue arose
in a worker's compensation setting. The court of appeals stated that it
did not need to reach a determination of whether a private cause of action
was created by the Act because the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act46 provided a remedy under the facts alleged. 47
In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Price,48 the Unfair Insurance
Practices Act was addressed in the context of the New Mexico Unfair
Practices Act.49 The court assumed, but did not decide, that the Unfair
Practices Act applies to insurance companies." After finding no factual
basis upon which to support a claim, the court stated the following with
regard to the Unfair Insurance Practices Act:
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

99 N.M. at 315, 657 P.2d at 642.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-11-9 to -22 (1978).
Id. §59-11-10.
Id. §59-11-13.
See infra text accompanying note 56.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-11-14 (1978).
Id. §59-11-15.
Id. §59-11-16.
Id. §59-11-17.
Id. §59-11-18.
99 N.M. 432, 659 P.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1983).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§52-1-1 to -69 (1978 and Cum. Supp. 1984).
99 N.M. at 435,659 P.2d at 321.
101 N.M. 438, 684 P.2d 524 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 362, 683 P.2d 362 (1984).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§57-12-1 to -16 (1978 and Cum. Supp. 1983).
101 N.M. at 446, 684 P.2d at 532.
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The defendants have also raised an issue concerning the Unfair Insurance Practices Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978, §§59-11-9 to -22.
However, that Act does not provide a private cause of action, as
defendants admit. The defendants argue that any violation of the
Unfair Insurance Practices Act is a per se violation of the Unfair
Practices Act. Having ruled that on retrial there is no issue concerning
the Unfair Practices Act, we need not consider this argument."
The court of appeals finally addressed the issue squarely in Patterson
v. GlobeAmerican Casualty Co.52 As noted by the court, when confronted
with the question of whether similar acts create private causes of action,
other jurisdictions have reached varying results." After examining the
purpose of the Act and the powers vested in the Superintendent of Insurance for purposes of enforcement, the court reiterated the general rule
that "when a right is created which did not exist at common law and for
that right a remedy is by statute prescribed, the whole matter of right and
remedy is within the statute and no part of either otherwise exists. ""
Based upon the presumption that the legislature in enacting a statute is
informed as to existing statutory and common law, the court found that
the legislature did not intend to create a private remedy under the Act.55
The Patterson holding has been changed by amendments to the Act
which went into effect on January 1, 1985. The Unfair Insurance Practices
Act, as amended, now includes a private cause of action with regard to
the insured. 6 This action, however, extends only to the insured, and not
to third party beneficiaries. Whether this statutorily created cause of action
actually broadens the existing common law causes of action against an
insurance company and its agents for bad faith actions remains to be
determined by the courts in interpreting the amended Act.
III. UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
A new area of insurance law which has generated a great deal of
litigation involves the interpretation of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in automobile liability policies. Uninsured motorist coverage was developed to protect persons injured in automobile accidents
from remaining uncompensated because of the tortfeasor's lack of liability
51. Id. at 447, 684 P.2d at 533.
52. 101 N.M. 541, 685 P.2d 396 (Ct. App. 1984).
53. Id. at 542, 685 P.2d at 397.
54. Id. at 544, 685 P.2d at 399.
55. Id. For an example of a case which did hold that a private cause of action existed, see Royal
Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). The
statute under consideration in Royal Globe, however, was slightly different from that of New Mexico.
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A-16-30 (1984).
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coverage.57 As stated by the court in Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.: "In other words, the legislative purpose in creating compulsory uninsured motorist coverage was to place the injured
policy-holder in the same position, with regard to the recovery of damages, that he would have been in if the tortfeasor had possessed liability
insurance." 58 Initially, uninsured motorist coverage became operative only
when the tortfeasor was totally uninsured. Because of this, an inequitable
result began to appear when the tortfeasor carried liability insurance, but
not in the amount of that carried by the insured. For example, suppose
that "A" carries liability insurance in the amount of $15,000 per person
and that "B" carries uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $100,000.
If "A" were to injure "B" in an automobile accident, then the maximum
that "B" could recover under the insurance policies would be $15,000.
In other words so long as "A" was insured, "B" could not look to his
own insurance policy for additional coverage even though his damages
59
might be more than the coverage provided by "A's" policy. To remedy
this problem, legislatures developed the concept of underinsured motorist
coverage. Pursuant to New Mexico statute:
"[U]nderinsured motorist" means an operator of a motor vehicle
with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which the sum
of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance
applicable at the time of the accident is less than the limits of liability
under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage.'
In other words, under the above scenario, "B" would be entitled to
recovery up to a total of $100,000, if his damages were that severe. He
could receive $15,000 from "A" and look to his own policy for additional
6
coverage because "A" is underinsured within the meaning of the statute. "
57. See State Farm Auto. Ins. v. Kiehne, 97 N.M. 470, 471, 641 P.2d 501, 502 (1982). The
New Mexico Supreme Court has already held that an insured may sue the insurer directly rather
than first suing the tortfeasor in order to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage. Guess v.
Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d 869 (1981). The court of appeals also has recently ruled that
payment under uninsured motorist coverage does not constitute a recovery from a third party within
the meaning of the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §52-1-56(C)
(1978). Gantt v. L & G Air Conditioning, 101 N.M. 208, 680 P.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1983).
58. 87 N.M. 327, 329, 533 P.2d 100, 102 (1975) (quoting Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
33 Ohio St.2d 50, 52, 294 N.E.2d 665, 666 (1973)).
59. As stated by the court in Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, -_, 446 A.2d 1059,
1061 (1982), underinsured motorist coverage attempts "to remedy the 'anomalous situation' . . .
where an injured party could find himself in a better position if the tortfeasor had no liability insurance
than if he had only the statutory minimum amount." (Citations omitted.)
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-5-301(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
61. This view of the correct definition of underinsurance is now on appeal in two cases in the
New Mexico Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Martin
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., appeal docketed, No. 84-1879 (10th Cir. June 25, 1984); Schmick
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., cert. granted, No. 15459 (N.M. Sup. Ct. May 31, 1984). The
plaintiffs in both cases have taken the position that uninsured motorist coverage acts as excess
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One issue presented to the courts in recent years concerning uninsured
motorist coverage is whether an insured may stack his policies. "Stacking" refers to the insured's attempt to recover under more than one policy
of insurance by adding one policy to another until either his damages are
satisfied or the limits of the policies are exhausted. 62 For example, assume
that "A" has purchased two policies of automobile insurance for two
separate cars, with uninsured limits of $25,000 each. Assume further that
"A" suffers severe injuries in an accident with uninsured motorist "B."
Query: Can "A" recover up to $25,000 or $50,000? A similar question
is presented when "A" has two automobiles covered by one policy of
insurance.
The latter fact pattern confronted the court in Lopez v. Foundation
Reserve Insurance Co. 63 Specifically, in Lopez, the policy provided coverage in the amount of $15,000 per person or $30,000 per accident. Both
Lopez and his passenger were killed in a collision with an uninsured
motorist. Their personal representatives sought recovery of $60,000 on
the basis that the $30,000 per accident coverage on each should be stacked.'
The court first considered the applicable policy language, specifically
that referring to limits of liability: "[T]he company's limit of liability for
all such damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or more
persons in any one accident shall not exceed the amount specified by
such financial responsibility law for bodily injury to two or more persons
in any one accident." 65 The financial responsibility law to which this
refers is the Financial Responsibility Act,' which at that time provided
for minimum limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. The
court noted that the provision, on its face, appeared to limit the company's
liability to $30,000 per accident. However, because the contract did not
directly address the effect of multiple premiums paid under one policy
insuring more than one vehicle, it was found to be ambiguous.67 The
court, therefore, proceeded to interpret the policy of insurance, invoking
the cardinal rule that any ambiguities
are construed against the insurance
6
company which drafted the policy. 1
insurance. This would lead to the result that, in the scenario presented, "A" might recover up to an
additional $100,000, rather than the difference between $100,000 and $15,000, from his own
underinsured motorist coverage. Some courts have endorsed this view under differently worded
statutes. See, e.g., Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980); Whitten v.
Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 353 So. 2d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
62. See, e.g., Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 168-69, 646 P.2d 1230,
1232-33 (1982).
63. Id.
64. Id.at 167, 646 P.2d at 1231.
65. Id.at 168, 646 P.2d at 1232.
66. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§66-5-201 to -239 (Repi. Pamp. 1984).
67. 98 N.M. at 168, 646 P.2d at 1232.
68. Id.
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Initially, the court referred to an earlier decision in Sloan v. Dairyland
Insurance Co.69 and stated that Sloan permitted inter-policy stacking. 7"
In actuality, Sloan interpreted an "other insurance" clause. The issue
presented was whether an insured's estate, which had recovered the uninsured motorist limits under the policy for the automobile in which she
was a passenger, could recover under her uninsured motorist coverage
on her own vehicle. In ruling that the estate was entitled to the proceeds
under both policies, the court refused to give effect to the "other insurance" clause. 7
In Lopez, the court directly addressed the issue of stacking in the interpolicy context; the policy in question provided coverage for two automobiles with separate premiums paid for each. 72 The first question which
the court examined concerned the question of whether, in enacting the
statute for uninsured motorist coverage," 3 the legislature intended that
separate full uninsured motorist coverage be provided for each vehicle
under one policy. The court declined to follow this interpretation of the
statute and found that only each of several vehicles insured under a single
policy be covered by one minimum coverage.74 Such a result, however,
would not preclude purchase of additional coverage beyond the statutory
minimum.
The court further indicated that stacking in this instance fulfilled the
reasonable expectations of the insured. 75 An important point, the court
felt, was the payment of separate premiums:
It would be inconsistent to permit stacking in Sloan cases and deny
stacking in cases where all the vehicles are insured under one policy
but the same additional premiums are charged as would be charged
if the coverage were provided by multiple policies. . . . The crucial
question, therefore, is not whether multiple vehicles are insured under
one policy or several, but whether the insured has paid one premium
or several for the particular uninsured motorist coverage sought to
be stacked.76
The court did indicate, however, that multiple premiums may not always
dictate a stacking situation if the company can establish that they were
coverage."
for the same
notOne
charged
merits comment. The court did not permit
in Lopez
final indication
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974).
Lopez, 98 N.M. at 169, 646 P.2d at 1233 (citing Sloan, 86 N.M. at 68, 519 P.2d at 304).
86 N.M. at 68, 519 P.2d at 304.
98 N.M. at 167, 646 P.2d at 1231.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-5-301 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
98 N.M. at 170, 646 P.2d at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 171, 646 P.2d at 1235 (citation omitted).
Id. at 171, 646 P.2d at 1235.
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the coverage to be stacked as to the passenger because he was not a
named insured under either policy.7" In addition, it should be noted that
a definitive answer has not been reached in New Mexico with regard to
stacking of underinsurance coverage."
In enacting legislation for uninsured motorist coverage, state legislatures have sought to ensure that a person could provide for his own
compensation should he be injured by an uninsured driver. This concept
grew to encompass the idea of underinsurance, so that the same person
might guarantee himself coverage in excess of the minimum amount
required by law. New Mexico at this time only mandates that each person
carry insurance in the amounts of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per
accident. 80 To state that almost any severe accident can cause damages
far in excess of those amounts is to voice the obvious. Perhaps because
of this, the courts have many times stretched to find the maximum amount
of coverage possible. Stacking of policies provides a ready means to this
end.8
However, in March v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., 2 the New
Mexico Supreme Court balked at ignoring clear policy language to expand
underinsurance coverage. In that case, the insured had purchased $50,000
in underinsured motorist coverage from Mountain States. The policy
required that the insurer receive prompt notice of an accident and that no
settlements be made with third parties without its consent. Further, Mountain States possessed a right of subrogation under the policy.83
The insured in this case suffered injuries as a result of an accident with
a person having policy limits of $25,000. He settled for that amount
without notice to Mountain States and then made demand for $50,000
under the underinsured coverage provided by Mountain States. Mountain
States denied coverage and any liability under the policy."
The March court confronted the issue of whether the insured's release
and settlement with the alleged tortfeasor's insurance company without
the consent or knowledge of Mountain States relieved the latter of its
obligations to the insured. Initially, the court noted the insured's actions
violated the provisions of the policy regardless of whether he had received
payment from Mountain States.85 Furthermore, pursuant to settled New
78. Id. at 172, 646 P.2d at 1236.
79. This issue is also on appeal in the cases noted supra note 61.
80. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-5-215 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
81. For an example of the multitude of cases which have permitted stacking of coverage, see
Annot., 25 A.L.R.4th 6 (1983). As is evident from a perusal of those decisions, the courts have
ruled in favor (if stacking in almost every conceivable situation.
82. 101 N.M. 689, 687 P.2d 1040 (1984).
83. Id. at 690, 687 P.2d at 1041.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 692, 687 P.2d at 1043. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83
N.M. 280, 491 P.2d 168 (1971); Motto v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 81 N.M. 35, 462 P.2d
620 (1969).
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Mexico law, his actions destroyed any rights of subrogation which the
insurance company might have had.86
On this premise, the court addressed the question of whether the fact
of underinsurance demanded a different result. It found that it did not.
After an examination of the statutes in question, the court stated: "[W]e
find that the well established contractual nature of subrogation rights in
New Mexico logically justified the use of protective consent provisions,
even though our uninsured motorist statutes do not expressly allow such
rights or provisions." 87 The court, therefore, ruled in favor of Mountain
States on the ground that the insured had violated the express provisions
of the insurance contract.88
As these cases demonstrate, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage can present new and different issues to the courts. Many questions
remain to be decided concerning the interpretation of various clauses as
they relate to these types of insurance in the context of the specific and
well-defined public policy considerations.
Whether mandatory insurance in New Mexico 9 diminishes litigation
in the area of insurance remains to be determined. Underinsured motorist
coverage, however, which has essentially the same philosophy, presents
a different outlook since anyone may choose to contract for more insurance
than that required by statute.
IV. DUTIES OF THE INSURER
Virtually all insurance contracts contain two basic duties for the insurer:
to defend and to pay. As the case law has evolved, the duty to defend
has developed differently from the duty to pay under the policy. In other
words, the insurance company might owe a duty to defend a claim, but
it might still dispute its liability to pay it.
For example, in Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. v. Mullenix9 the
court confronted the following situation. The policy in question covered
a tow truck. While towing a tractor-trailer rig, the tow truck was damaged
in an accident. The owner of the rig sued the insured. The insurance
company brought a separate declaratory judgment action, alleging that
there was no coverage due to an exclusion in the policy for property
being transported by or in charge of the insured. 9
The court first noted the general rule concerning the duty to defend as
stated in American Employers' Insurance Co. v. Continental Casualty
Co.:
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

101 N.M. at 692, 687 P.2d at 1043.
Id. at 693, 687 P.2d at 1044.
Id.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-215 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
97 N.M. 618, 642 P.2d 604 (1982).
Id. at 619, 642 P.2d at 605.
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If the allegations of the injured third party's complaint show that an
accident or occurrence comes within the coverage of the policy, the
insurer is obligated to defend, regardless of the ultimate liability of
the insured. The question presented to the insurer in each case is
whether the injured party's complaint states facts which bring the
case within the coverage of the policy, not whether he can prove an
action against the insured for damages. The insurer must also fulfill
its promise to defend even though the complaint fails to state facts
with sufficient clarity so that it may be determined from its face
whether or not the action is within the coverage of the policy, provided the alleged facts tend to show an occurrence within the coverage .92

In this particular case, the complaint failed to allege with particularity
the fact that the rig was being towed at the time of the accident. Because
of this, the court found that the complaint tended to show an occurrence
within the coverage of the policy. Therefore, it held there was in fact a
duty to defend.9 3
What makes Mullenix of particular interest is the language concerning
the appropriate procedural course an insurance company must follow to
challenge its alleged duty to defend under a policy of insurance. The
court indicated that an insurer cannot bring a separate declaratory action
to determine whether there is coverage under the policy.94
The issue concerning the correct manner in which to bring a declaratory
action, along with several others, appeared in State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Price.95 In that case, the insured was involved in an accident
while driving his girlfriend's car. The primary carrier on her vehicle
defended and tendered policy limits. State Farm carried the policy on the
insured's vehicle and denied excess coverage on the basis that an exclusion
applied. The insured settled with the injured parties and assigned any
cause of action he might have against State Farm to the latter. State Farm
then brought a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage.'
The opinion addressed several issues, but among the most important
was the duty to defend. Neither the insured nor his personal attorney had
ever made an express demand that State Farm join in the defense of the
lawsuit. The court did find, however, that a question of fact existed as
to whether a demand was made. The court in so ruling looked to certain
correspondence which notified State Farm that litigation had ensued. 97
The defendants argued that State Farm had waived its right to bring a
92. 84 N.M. 346, 348, 512 P.2d 674, 676 (1973).
93. 97 N.M. at 620, 642 P.2d at 606.
94. Id. An interesting question presented by this procedural comment is whether this would be
binding upon the United States District Court in diversity actions.
95. 101 N.M. 438, 684 P.2d 524 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 362, 683 P.2d 44 (1984).
96. Id. at 441, 684 P.2d at 527.
97. Id. at 442-44, 684 P.2d at 528-30.
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declaratory judgment action because it had not defended the primary
lawsuit. The court distinguished Mullenix98 on the basis that there was
no clear demand to defend in this instance. Because the existence of the
latter presented a question of fact for the jury, the court refused to hold
as a matter of law that State Farm had waived its right to bring the
action."

Price reemphasized the distinction between the duty to defend and the
duty to pay. The court found that coverage did not exist as a matter of
law. However, because the allegations in the complaint failed to establish
that fact clearly, the duty to defend did exist. Furthermore, the court
noted that the active defense provided by the primary carrier did not
relieve State Farm of this duty."
State Farm also alleged that the insured had failed to cooperate and
had entered into the stipulation of settlement without notifying it, which
constituted a breach of the policy. Again, the court found that questions
of fact existed on these issues. The court indicated that the first determination which should be made upon remand was whether the insured
did demand a defense. If he did, then the obligation to defend arose
pursuant to the policy."'0 The court next noted that the insurer, by failing
to defend, could suffer serious consequences:
These consequences include loss of the right to claim that the insured
breached policy provisions ....
including the policy provisions requiring the insured to forward suit papers. . . . The insurance com-

pany loses the right to claim that the insured did not cooperate...
and the right to claim that the insured settled without its consent ....
When an insurance company unjustifiably fails to defend it becomes
liable for a judgment entered against the insured and for any settlement entered into by the insured in good faith. . . . The settlement
must be reasonable. . . . On retrial jury issues may include Price's

good faith in making the settlement and the reasonableness of its
amount.

02

1

The court further found that failure to defend, after being requested to
do so, might amount to bad faith depending upon the circumstances. 103
Thus, Price clearly indicates that an insurer should always be cautious
and err on the side of providing a defense, or be prepared to suffer the
consequences.
Hendren v. Allstate Insurance Co."° focused on the duty of the insurer
98. 97 N.M. 618, 642 P.2d 604 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
99. 101 N.M. at 444, 684 P.2d at 530.
100. Id. at 442-43, 684 P.2d at 528-29.
101. Id. at 445, 684 P.2d at 531.
102. Id. (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 446, 684 P.2d at 532.
104. 100 N.M. 506, 672 P.2d 1137 (Ct. App. 1983).
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to deal in good faith with an insured. In that case, the insured had been
severely injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist. The policy
covered either two or three vehicles, with limits of $15,000 per person.
The adjuster who handled the claim advised the insured that Allstate
would pay the maximum amount available, $15,000. Further, the insured
received the impression that he could receive nothing additional even if
counsel were obtained. Thus, a settlement was entered into for the sum
of $15,000. 105
In less than a year after the insured had released Allstate, the supreme
court decided Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co., 06 which, as
stated previously,° 7 permitted intrapolicy stacking of uninsured motorist
coverage. The insured then brought an action seeking to have the settlement voided because of misrepresentation. o'
The court found that the adjuster's statement of maximum coverage
constituted a material statement upon which he should have realized that
the insured would rely. Thus, the issue arose as to whether the insured
had a right to rely upon the statement. The court noted the dual role
played by an adjuster with regard to uninsured motorist coverage: because
the insurer sold the policy, he has an obligation to the insured; however,
he must assume an adversarial role as to questions involving the uninsured
motorist's negligence and any available defenses the uninsured motorist
might have."°
The Hendren court cited with approval and adopted the view forwarded
in Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.,"' stating:
[11n spite of its adversary interest, an insurer continues to have a
duty to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured in settling a
claim under the uninsured motorist provisions of the automobile
The rule we adopt does not mean that the
insurance contract ....
insurer is precluded from defending the uninsured motorist or from
evaluating the claim any differently than it would have had it provided
third party coverage. What it does mean, however, and particularly
as applied to this case, is that the insurer must deal in good faith
and fairly as to the terms of the policy and not overreach the insured,
despite its adversary interest."'
Because of the prior ruling in Sloan v. DairylandInsurance Co." 2 and
the clear trend permitting stacking in other jurisdictions, the court held
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 507-08, 672 P.2d at 1138-39.
98 N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 63-79.
See supra text accompanying notes 69-79.
100 N.M. at 508, 672 P.2d at 1139.
Id. at 509-10, 672 P.2d at 1140-41.
572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana law).
100 N.M. at 510, 672 P.2d at 1141 (citation omitted).
86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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that the trier of fact could find that the insurer should have known that
stacking might pertain to this policy. Had the adjuster told the insured
his position, but that a different result might be obtained, he would have
fulfilled his duties. Because he did not, the court remanded the case for
a trial on the merits on the issue of misrepresentation." 3
V. EXCLUSION AND TIME PROVISIONS
After an insured makes a demand under his policy for coverage, the
insurance company determines whether coverage, in fact, exists. The
correct interpretation of policy exclusions constitutes a particularly fertile
ground for litigation. In addition, various obligations of the insured, and
failure to comply therewith, may present a basis for denial of coverage.
For example, in Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. O'Brien,"4 the supreme court addressed the issue of whether there must be a causal connection between an exclusion and the loss in order for the exclusion to
be given effect. The insured suffered a loss when his aircraft collided
with another aircraft. The policy in question provided that it did not apply
when the aircraft was in flight unless the aircraft's airworthiness certificate
was in full force and effect. The parties stipulated, in effect, that no causal
relationship existed between the failure to obtain a certificate and the
cause of the crash. The insured claimed that without such a connection
the exclusion did not apply." 5
The court held that coverage did not exist and cited the court of appeals'
decision in Peterson v. Romero" 6 in support of its result. Further, it
distinguished FoundationReserve Insurance Co. v. Esquibel, 7 upon which
plaintiff relied. Esquibel held that an insurer must demonstrate "substantial prejudice" before it can be relieved of its obligations under an insurance policy." 8 The court noted that Esquibel addressed a situation
involving a condition subsequent rather than specific policy exclusions. '
The breach of a condition subsequent "terminate[s] or suspend[s] the
insurance, [whereas a policy exclusion] declare[s] that there never was
insurance with respect to the excluded risk." 2 ° Based upon this distinction, the court found that substantial prejudice was irrelevant with regard
to policy exclusions. Furthermore, the court ruled that a causal connection
between an exclusion clause and an accident need not be established to
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

100 N.M. at 511, 672 P.2d at 1142.
99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983).
Id. at 639, 662 P.2d 640.
88 N.M. 483, 542 P.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1975).
94 N.M. 132, 607 P.2d 1150 (1980).
Id. at 134, 607 P.2d at 1152.
99 N.M. at 639, 662 P.2d at 640.
Id. at 640, 662 P.2d at 641 (quoting 7 Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d § 36.48 (1961)).
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deny coverage. In essence, the court's rationale was that to hold otherwise
would be to rewrite the insurance policy.'
Another exclusion issue arose in State FarmAutomobile Insurance Co.
v. Kiehne 2 with regard to uninsured motorist coverage. The insured's
policy specifically excepted coverage as to a named individual. That
individual, while driving an insured vehicle, was later involved in an
accident which resulted in the death of a passenger. A claim was made
under the uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm denied coverage on
the basis of the exclusion. 2 3
After finding that the clause was not ambiguous, the court addressed
the issue of whether the clause violated the purposes and public policy
of the uninsured motorist statute. 124 The court noted that the named insured
had the right to reject uninsured coverage, and on that basis, stated that
a failure to carry such coverage did not violate public policy. The court,
therefore, upheld the exclusion. 2 5
One additional ground upon which coverage may be denied under a
policy of insurance includes the provisions governing the process of
making claims. This encompasses the proof of loss, notice to the company,
cooperation of the insured, and other such matters. One particularly important clause found in many policies is the time to sue provision. In
' the supreme court addressed
Young v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 26
the applicability of a time to sue provision to a loss payee. The owner
of an aircraft had leased it to Seven Bar Flying Service. Seven Bar insured
the plane under a master policy with National Union Fire Insurance
Company. A loss occurred, but the owner failed to sue National within
the time prescribed by the policy. 127
The court first noted that time provisions in insurance policies which
limit the period within which suit may be brought after damage occurs,
if reasonable, are valid and enforceable in New Mexico. ' The plaintiff,
however, claimed that the insurance company had waived the limitation
and, therefore, was estopped from asserting the defense. The plaintiff's
that, as loss payee, he was not
claim was based primarily upon the1 fact
29
furnished with a copy of the policy.
121. Id. at 640-41, 662 P.2d at 641-42. For an example of another exclusion provision in aircraft
coverage, see Gelder v. Puritan Ins. Co., 100 N.M. 240, 668 P.2d 1117 (Ct. App. 1983), in which
the court discussed and applied an exclusion as to losses occurring during a conversion.
122. 97 N.M. 470, 641 P.2d 501 (1982).
123. id. at 470-71, 641 P.2d at 501-02.
124. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-5-301 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
125. 97 N.M. at 471-72, 641 P.2d at 502-03.
126. 101 N.M. 545, 685 P.2d 953 (1984).
127. Id. at 546, 685 P.2d at 954.
128. Id. at 547, 685 P.2d at 955. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Kemper Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 466, 632
P.2d 343 (1981).
129. 101 N.M. at 547, 685 P.2d at 955.
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In the court's view, whether a waiver had occurred depended upon two
primary factors: (1) what documents had been furnished to the insured;
and (2) whether the insurer had given the impression that all of the material
provisions could be found in them. In this particular instance, the plaintiff
had received a certificate of insurance which specifically stated that the
original policy must be consulted for details concerning coverage. The
30
court, therefore, found no waiver or estoppel.
Finally, the court also held that a time to sue provision also applied to
the loss payee, as well as the named insured. The rights of the loss payee,
the court reasoned, could not rise above those of the insured since a loss
payee is not a party to the contract.' 3

130. Id. at 548, 685 P.2d at 956.
131. Id. at 548-49, 685 P.2d at 956-57.

